



New Directions in Attack Tree Research:


Catching up with Industrial Needs

Olga Gadyatskaya and Rolando Trujillo-Rasua

Attack trees

- Graphical model to represent attack scenarios [B. Schneier 1999]
 - **Root node:** main attack goal
 - **Refinement operators:**
 - AND - all children nodes to be done
 - OR - at least one children node to be done
 - SAND, K-of-N, etc.
 - **Leaf nodes:** atomic attack steps

Example



[Mauw and Oostdijk 2005]

Attack trees

Theory
vs
Practical needs



Theory

- Formal underpinnings
 - **Semantics:** what is an attack tree, are 2 trees equivalent
 - **Extensions:** not only attack nodes, more refinement operators
 - **Quantitative analysis methods:** measuring attack scenarios

Attack tree process in practice

- **Design:** create a good tree
- **Interpretation:** read a tree
- **Use:** get value from a tree

Practice: Challenges

- **Design:** time-consuming, error-prone
- **Interpretation:** cognitive challenges, misconceptions
- **Use:** ROSI computation, missing data, justification to the customer

Tree design questions

- **NO PRECISE GUIDELINES**
 - how to structure the tree?
 - how to label nodes?
 - how to deal with repeating nodes?
 - what is the meaning of tree elements?


Attack tree value

- Facilitate brainstorming and communication across the board

“Attack tree is a mind map”

–Practitioner

Mind maps



[mindmeister.com]

More than a mind map

- Theory **boosts** practice
 - compute important attribute metrics and answer complex queries about attack scenarios
 - sensitivity analysis
- reuse (sub-)trees

**The attack tree
formalism is not aligned
with the practice**



Steps in the right direction

- **Attack tree generation:** automatically generate a tree from a system model
- **Validation:** confirm that the tree is complete and sound wrt to the model; evaluate that the tree is correct with respect to the semantics, a threat catalogue, or data.
- **Visualisation:** show the tree in a comprehensible manner
- **Evaluation of the formalism:** investigate empirically whether attack trees facilitate threat modelling and how they do it

Theory vs Practice: what is an attack tree?

- Anything that complies with the definition is an attack tree
- if a method generates something that complies with the definition, it is useful
 - even if this “tree” is huge and incomprehensible
- large, complete trees are good
- allow to better express and analyse attacks

VS

- An attack tree is valuable for its refinement structure & as a communication means
- higher-level nodes are more abstract attack elements than lower level ones
- a tree cannot be too big
- difficult to comprehend and make decisions

Theory vs Practice: how to interpret a tree?

- Attack tree semantics are defined via combinations of leaf nodes

- **bottom-up** interpretation

VS

- Humans start with the top goal and refine it subsequently into lower level ones

- **top-down** reasoning

It's now time to work on

- a more **rigorous methodology** for attack tree application in industry
 - find and eliminate the pitfalls
 - tree structure for comprehensibility; validation
- automated **generation approaches** that are more comprehensible and fit the industry process
 - refinement-aware, natural language-based, well-structured
- **empirical studies** of attack trees
 - a way to find many answers

Thank you!

olga.gadyatskaya@uni.lu

